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Trial Delay Caused by Discrete Systemwide Events: The Post-Jordan Era Meets
the Age of COVID-19
Abstract
Court closures necessitated by COVID-19 have resulted in extensive trial delay, with implications for the
section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time. Although COVID-19 appears to be a
straightforward example of an “exceptional circumstance” under the Jordan framework that governs
section 11(b), careful analysis reveals that it falls within a category not contemplated by that
framework—what this article calls “discrete systemwide events.” Because COVID delay impacts cases
across the system, the reasonable steps that can be taken to reduce it are themselves largely systemic in
nature. Crucially, the exceptional circumstances analysis stipulated by Jordan focuses exclusively on the
steps available in an individual case, while systemic delay is addressed indirectly through presumptive
ceilings. Because the presumptive ceilings were not calibrated with COVID-19 in mind, they cannot
account for COVID delay. Nor can systemic responses to COVID delay be assessed as part of the general
exceptional circumstances analysis: Such an approach would require judges to adjudicate the
reasonableness of myriad institutional policies, giving rise to problems ranging from a lack of data to
separation of powers issues. This conundrum points towards one of two extremes: discount COVID delay
without a full Jordan analysis, thereby partially relieving the Crown of its burden to justify presumptively
unreasonable delay and leaving accused persons to bear the cost; or effectively prevent Crowns from
justifying COVID delay as an exceptional circumstance, thereby risking thousands of stayed criminal
charges flowing from the pandemic. This article suggests an alternative approach that navigates between
these extremes: In some instances, delay caused by a discrete systemwide event like COVID-19 should be
remedied by a sentencing reduction, authorized either by the Charter or by the sentencing process set out
in the Criminal Code. This solution, while imperfect, achieves a more palatable result while adding
minimal complexity to the section 11(b) analysis. If adopted, it could save accused persons from
disproportionately bearing the costs of COVID delay, which would be the likely outcome were the Jordan
framework applied straightforwardly.
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Trial Delay Caused by Discrete
Systemwide Events: The Post-Jordan
Era Meets the Age of COVID-19
PALMA PACIOCCO*
Court closures necessitated by COVID-19 have resulted in extensive trial delay, with
implications for the section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time. Although
COVID-19 appears to be a straightforward example of an “exceptional circumstance” under
the Jordan framework that governs section 11(b), careful analysis reveals that it falls within a
category not contemplated by that framework—what this article calls “discrete systemwide
events.” Because COVID delay impacts cases across the system, the reasonable steps that
can be taken to reduce it are themselves largely systemic in nature. Crucially, the exceptional
circumstances analysis stipulated by Jordan focuses exclusively on the steps available in an
individual case, while systemic delay is addressed indirectly through presumptive ceilings.
Because the presumptive ceilings were not calibrated with COVID-19 in mind, they cannot
account for COVID delay. Nor can systemic responses to COVID delay be assessed as part
of the general exceptional circumstances analysis: Such an approach would require judges
to adjudicate the reasonableness of myriad institutional policies, giving rise to problems
ranging from a lack of data to separation of powers issues. This conundrum points towards
one of two extremes: discount COVID delay without a full Jordan analysis, thereby partially
relieving the Crown of its burden to justify presumptively unreasonable delay and leaving
accused persons to bear the cost; or effectively prevent Crowns from justifying COVID delay
as an exceptional circumstance, thereby risking thousands of stayed criminal charges
flowing from the pandemic. This article suggests an alternative approach that navigates
between these extremes: In some instances, delay caused by a discrete systemwide
*
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event like COVID-19 should be remedied by a sentencing reduction, authorized either by
the Charter or by the sentencing process set out in the Criminal Code. This solution, while
imperfect, achieves a more palatable result while adding minimal complexity to the section
11(b) analysis. If adopted, it could save accused persons from disproportionately bearing the
costs of COVID delay, which would be the likely outcome were the Jordan framework applied
straightforwardly.
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IN THE SUMMER OF 2016, the Supreme Court of Canada radically revised
the framework for assessing claims under section 11(b) of the Charter, which
guarantees accused persons the right “to be tried within a reasonable time.”1
Decrying “the culture of delay and complacency” that had come to characterize our
criminal justice system, the majority in R v Jordan established a new section 11(b)
framework and urged all criminal justice system actors to recommit themselves to
delivering timely trials.2 Te doctrinal change was dramatic enough that courts
and legal commentators soon began demarcating the “pre-Jordan era” and the
“post-Jordan era.”3 Less than four years into the post-Jordan era, in March 2020,
the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 to be a global pandemic,
and courts across Canada closed to slow its spread. Te imperative of ensuring
timely trials yielded to the necessity of promoting public health. Te post-Jordan
era met the age of COVID-19.
As of this writing, criminal courts have begun to reopen but are not yet at
full capacity. As courts reopen, they face dockets congested with older cases that
were delayed by court closures, plus a backlog of newer cases initiated during
1.
2.
3.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 11(b), Part I of Te Constitution Act, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982 [Charter].
R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 at para 29 [Jordan].
See especially R v Myers, 2019 SCC 18 at para 58.

PACIOCCO, TRIAL DELAY 837

or after the closure periods. Some of the accused persons squeezing through the
resulting bottleneck have been languishing in pretrial detention at a time when
jail conditions are more dangerous and desperate than usual.4 Others have been
released pending trial. For some of them, material conditions—such as curfews
or home confnement—may actually have been relatively similar to those
experienced by members of the general public under social distancing orders;
but the emotional, social, and fnancial stresses associated with pending criminal
charges, and the psychological and economic strain caused by COVID-19,
are likely to be mutually exacerbating. Meanwhile, victims, witnesses, and the
many family and community networks impacted by criminal prosecutions
have been enduring an extended period of anticipation at a time when stress is
already running high, and when access to support and fellowship is restricted.
Furthermore, many of those who are disproportionately likely to be prosecuted
for crimes, or to be victims of crime, are also likely to be among those hit hardest
by COVID-19. Tis is so because people from equity-seeking groups—those who
are economically marginalized, racialized, Indigenous, disabled, LGBTQ2S+,
street-involved, engaged in sex work, and/or experiencing addiction or other
forms of mental ill-health—tend to be disproportionately impacted by crime
and the criminal justice system5 and by public health emergencies, including

4.

5.

Amanda Jerome, “Bail, sentencing impacted as jail could be ‘death sentence’ during
pandemic, lawyer says,” Te Lawyer’s Daily (15 May 2020), online: <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/
articles/19059/bail-sentencing-impacted-as-jail-could-be-death-sentence-during-pandemiclawyer-says> [perma.cc/7HH6-M7VE].
See e.g. Robyn Maynard, Policing Black Lives: State Violence in Canada from Slavery to
the Present (Fernwood Publishing, 2017); Jonathan Rudin, “Aboriginal Peoples and the
Criminal Justice System” (2005) (Research Paper Commissioned by the Ipperwash Inquiry),
online (pdf ): Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General <www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/
inquiries/ipperwash/policy_part/research/pdf/Rudin.pdf> [perma.cc/D4DY-MMWF];
Terry Skolnik, “Homelessness and Unconstitutional Discrimination” 15 JL & Equality
69 at 72-73, 79; Statistics Canada, Violent victimization of lesbians, gays and bisexuals in
Canada, 2014, by Laura Simpson, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Catalogue No
85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 31 May 2018), online: Statistics Canada <www150.
statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2018001/article/54923-eng.htm> [perma.cc/SN5Q-NQP9];
Kyle Kirkup, Relations Between Police and LGBTQ2S+ Communities (Independent Civilian
Review into Missing Persons Investigations, 2020), online (pdf ): <8e5a70b5-92aa-40aea0bd-e885453ee64c.flesusr.com/ugd/681ae0_1d67158e1b824d21a1450dbcdebbc435.pdf>
[perma.cc/P4FK-Z2ZD].
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COVID-19.6 In short, then, as they reopen, our criminal courts face a massive
backlog, and the human stakes are extraordinarily high.
In this unprecedented situation, how should courts approach section 11(b)
claims relating to trial delay caused by COVID-19? (In what follows, this type of
delay is referred to by the shorthand “COVID delay.”) Te most obvious response
is that COVID delay constitutes an “exceptional circumstance” under the Jordan
framework, and as such should be subtracted from the total period of delay that
is counted for section 11(b) purposes. Yet, a closer look at the section 11(b)
jurisprudence reveals that this straightforward response is problematic. Under the
Jordan framework, delay can only be deducted as an “exceptional circumstance”
if the Crown can satisfy a two prong test: (1) it must show that the circumstance
causing the delay was reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable; and (2)
it must show that, once this circumstance arose, the Crown and the criminal
justice system could not reasonably have remedied the resulting delay. Ordinarily,
this second prong focuses on the particular actions that were taken, or ought
to have been taken, in the case at hand; it does not involve a broader analysis
of systemic eforts to limit trial delay. Systemic delay is addressed indirectly,
through the application of numerical ceilings above which delay is presumptively
unreasonable: Once other aspects of the Jordan analysis are factored in, the
assessment of whether the ceiling was breached in a given case functions as a sort
of proxy for evaluating systemic delay.
COVID delay is unique. It results from an exceptional circumstance, but a
pervasive one that impacts cases across the system. Accordingly, the reasonable
steps that can be taken to limit COVID delay must themselves be largely
6.

See e.g. Kwame McKenzie, “Anti-racism legislation needed to ensure equitable public
health response,” Toronto Star (25 June 2020), online: <www.thestar.com/opinion/
contributors/2020/06/25/anti-racism-legislation-needed-to-ensure-equitable-public-healthresponses.html> [perma.cc/4D8D-ZZGR]; Kaitlin Curice & Esther Choo, “Indigenous
populations: left behind in the COVID-19 response” (6-12 June 2020), online: Elsevier
Public Health Emergency Collection <www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7272170>
[perma.cc/ABC3-FEAL]; Bridget M Kuehn, “Homeless Shelters Face High COVID-19
Risks,” JAMA Network (9 June 2020), DOI: <10.1001/jama.2020.8854>; John P Salerno,
Natasha D Williams & Karina A Gattamorta, “LGBTQ Populations: Psychologically
Vulnerable Communities in the COVID-19 Pandemic” (2020) 12 Psychological
Trauma: Teory, Research, Pract, Pol’y 239 (advance online publication), DOI: <dx.doi.
org/10.1037/tra0000837>; Lucy Platt et al, “Sex workers must not be forgotten in the
COVID-19 response” (2020) 396 Lancet 9, online: <www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/
article/PIIS0140-6736(20)31033-3/fulltext> [perma.cc/A6UJ-WZYG]; Te Agenda
with Steve Paikin, “Demanding Disability Rights Amid COVID-19,” (8 May 2020),
online (video): TVO <www.tvo.org/video/demanding-disability-rights-amid-covid-19>
[perma.cc/3R7P-W6MB].
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systemic in nature. Tey may include, for example, more strenuous charge
screening protocols to reduce global caseloads, and procedural and technological
innovations to enable remote proceedings. If the Jordan framework is to be
respected in substance and not merely in form, then both prongs of the analysis
must be meaningfully assessed whenever the Crown claims COVID delay is an
exceptional circumstance. Te analysis must include an assessment of whether
the Crown and the criminal justice system took reasonable steps to mitigate
the delay. Otherwise, Crowns would be informally relieved of their burden to
show that presumptively unreasonable delay truly qualifes as an exceptional
circumstance. Concretely, this would mean that, even if Crowns and other
criminal justice actors collectively failed to take very obvious, important steps to
move trials along, resulting in presumptively unreasonable delay, accused persons
would be made to bear the resulting harms, contrary to the design and purpose
of the Jordan framework and of the section 11(b) Charter right itself.
Yet, as I will explain, there are signifcant problems with attempting to
evaluate the reasonableness of institutional responses to COVID delay. Quite
simply, systemic mitigation eforts cannot be meaningfully assessed within the
Jordan framework. Tere are overwhelming problems associated with asking
judges to scrutinize institutional responses to COVID-19 when adjudicating
individual section 11(b) claims, ranging from a lack of data to separation of powers
considerations. Further, there is no mechanism for assessing these responses
indirectly, since the presumptive ceilings that normally serve this function were
not calibrated with an event like the COVID-19 pandemic in mind. Nor would
it do to simply vary those ceilings: For reasons that are elaborated below, we could
not establish a principled standard for assessing the COVID delay that accrued
before the new ceilings were introduced. In short, the Jordan framework cannot
work as intended without a direct or indirect analysis of systemic delay, and it
cannot accommodate an analysis of systemic delay in the COVID context.
One could, of course, take the position that if the Crown cannot discharge
its burden to justify presumptively unreasonable delay—for whatever reason—
then the section 11(b) claim must succeed. Te trouble with this position is
that it has been determined that section 11(b) violations can only be remedied
by stays of proceedings, and the prospect of staying criminal charges across the
country because of delay attributable to the pandemic is so anathema as to make
this response nonviable.
What is required, then, is a creative, practical approach to redressing
COVID delay; one that navigates between the extremes of requiring either too
much or too little attention to institutional responses, and that is both consistent
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with the existing Jordan framework and sensitive to current material realities.
My aim in this article is to propose such an approach. Concretely, I suggest that,
in some instances, COVID delay should attract a diferent remedy—specifcally,
a sentencing reduction—as an alternative to either staying cases across the board
or insisting that the delay is justifed based on an anemic Jordan analysis. Te
proposed solution is a compromise, and as such is imperfect. It has the merit,
however, of attaining a more nuanced result than the Jordan framework could
achieve while adding relatively little complexity to the analysis. More importantly,
if adopted, it could save accused persons from almost unilaterally bearing the
costs of COVID delay, which would be the likely result were Jordan applied
straightforwardly.
Te remainder of the article unfolds as follows. Part I illustrates how
COVID-19 is causing delay and introduces some of the institutional responses
that have been adopted thus far. Part II sketches out the Jordan framework and
explains why this framework cannot account for COVID delay. To that end,
it proposes a refnement of the exceptional circumstances typology introduced
in Jordan. Te Jordan Court recognized that exceptional circumstances will
normally apply in two types of cases: “particularly complex cases,” which require
more time because of their intrinsic complexity; and cases delayed by “discrete
events,” i.e., by extrinsic occurrences. I propose that there are, in fact, two types
of “discrete events”: case-specifc events, the impacts of which are confned to a
single case (or to a very small number of cases); and systemwide events, which
massively disrupt the criminal justice system and result in trial delay across large
swaths of cases. When we consider the exceptional circumstances analysis in
light of this distinction, we see that the “discrete events” category recognized
by the Jordan Court is better characterized as “discrete case-specifc events.” Te
other category—“discrete systemwide events”—has yet to be recognized by the
jurisprudence. Te distinction matters because the discrete systemwide events
category is not amenable to analysis under the usual Jordan framework, for reasons
that are detailed below. COVID delay falls within the “discrete systemwide
events” category. As such, COVID delay cannot be satisfactorily addressed using
the existing Jordan framework. It requires an alternative analysis. Part III proposes
such an analysis, suggesting that delay attributable to “discrete systemwide
events”—including COVID delay—should attract a sentencing reduction under
some circumstances. Part III explains, further, that this sentencing reduction
could potentially be authorized by section 24(1) of the Charter or, more feasibly,
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by the sentencing regime set out in the Criminal Code, as interpreted by the
Court in R v Nasogaluak.7 Part IV concludes.

I. TRIAL DELAY RESULTING FROM COVID-19
In early 2020, courts across Canada confronted the threat of COVID-19.8 Te
following montage is far from exhaustive, but it is illustrative. In mid-March,
the Provincial Court of Nova Scotia announced it was adjourning some criminal
matters until June;9 the New Brunswick Provincial Court postponed trials for
out-of-custody accused;10 and the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador
limited operations and rescheduled court dates for non-urgent out-of-custody
cases.11 Te Prince Edward Island Supreme Court likewise suspended regular
operations. It started conducting case management conference calls again in May,
and it resumed other pre-trial proceedings and criminal trials in mid-June.12
Te Supreme Court of British Columbia suspended regular operations
efective March 19, adjourning most criminal matters until June and cancelling

7.

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code]; R v Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC
6 [Nasogaluak].
8. Elizabeth Raymer, “Courts across Canada restrict access or suspend operations due to
COVID-19,” Canadian Lawyer (16 March 2020), online: <www.canadianlawyermag.
com/news/general/courts-across-canada-restrict-access-or-suspend-operations-due-tocovid-19/327534> [perma.cc/9L24-7LRS].
9. See Executive Ofce of the Nova Scotia Judiciary, “COVID-19: Measures Applicable to the
Provincial Court of Nova Scotia” (16 March 2020), online (pdf ): Te Courts of Nova Scotia
<www.courts.ns.ca/News_of_Courts/documents/NSPC_Measures_03_16_20.pdf> [perma.
cc/8624-L9GW]; Executive Ofce of the Nova Scotia Judiciary, “COVID-19: Further
Restrictions in Provincial Courts” (18 March 2020), online (pdf ): Te Courts of Nova Scotia
<www.courts.ns.ca/News_of_Courts/documents/COVID_Prov_Court_Update_03_18_20.
pdf> [perma.cc/R64N-DXZ7].
10. “Measures Applicable to the Provincial Court of New Brunswick: Notice to the Media,
Justice Participants and the Public” (1 June 2020), online (pdf ): Law Society of New
Brunswick <www.lawsociety-barreau.nb.ca/fles/Public/COVID-19%20-%20NOTICE%20
EFFECTIVE%20JUNE%201ST%202020.pdf> [perma.cc/7QAE-JKF8].
11. Provincial Court of Newfoundland and Labrador, “COVID-19 Court Scheduling for the
Period March 16, 2020 to May 22, 2020, Inclusive” (17 March 2020), online (pdf ): <court.
nl.ca/provincial/COVID-19_Operational_Plan-Provincial_Court.pdf>.
12. “Prince Edward Island Courts–COVID-19 Impacts” (2 July 2020), online: Government of
Prince Edward Island <www.princeedwardisland.ca/en/information/justice-and-public-safety/
prince-edward-island-courts-covid-19-impacts> [perma.cc/6VK4-2EJL].
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jury selections until September.13 Te Alberta Provincial Court adjourned all
non-urgent matters, except for in-custody criminal matters, from March 17 to
May 22.14 Te Provincial Court of Manitoba suspended circuit court sittings and
out-of-custody proceedings from mid-March until the end of May.15 Te Court
of Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan postponed all jury trials set to commence
between March 16 and May 30 and adjourned all trials for out-of-custody
accused from March 20 to May 31.16
In the Northwest Territories, criminal proceedings scheduled for the period of
March 16 to July 6 were adjourned for all accused persons outside of Yellowknife,
and for out-of-custody accused in Yellowknife.17 Te Territorial Court of Yukon
suspended circuit travel in mid-March and adjourned all out-of-custody circuit
matters;18 it resumed in-person hearings in Whitehorse on July 6.19 Te Nunavut

13. Supreme Court of British Columbia, “Notice to the Profession, the Public and the Media
Regarding Criminal Proceedings: COVID-19: Expansion of Court Operations” (7 July
2020), online (pdf ): Te Courts of British Columbia <www.bccourts.ca/supreme_court/
documents/COVID-19_Notice_No.33_Expansion_of_Court_Operations_Criminal_
Proceedings_July_7_2020.pdf> [perma.cc/ZLA7-7CLP].
14. Provincial Court of Alberta, “COVID-19 Staged Resumption of Court Operations–Part
1” (19 May 2020), online: Alberta Courts <www.albertacourts.ca/docs/default-source/
pc/covid-19-staged-resumption-of-court-operations---part-1.pdf?sfvrsn=42c9780_4>
[perma.cc/A3AF-DE2V]; Provincial Court of Alberta, “COVID-19 Staged Resumption
Party 2 – July 6” online: Alberta Courts <www.albertacourts.ca/pc/resources/covid>
[perma.cc/U23T-T629].
15. Provincial Court of Manitoba, “Notice Re: COVID-19 Suspension and Re-Opening of
Some Courts” (15 May 2020), online (pdf ): Manitoba Courts <www.manitobacourts.
mb.ca/site/assets/fles/1966/notice_-_provincial_court_-_covid-19_-_reopening_courts_
may_15_2020_-_e.pdf> [perma.cc/9YJF-6PE8].
16. Courts of Saskatchewan Communications Ofce, “Court of Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan
Directive and Advisory” (19 March 2020), online (pdf ): <sasklawcourts.ca/images/
documents/Queens_Bench/COVID_Update_3_19.pdf> [perma.cc/7FUV-W9H4].
17. Courts of the Northwest Territories, “Territorial Court Directive on COVID 19” (last
modifed 6 July 2020), online: Northwest Territories Courts <www.nwtcourts.ca/en/
nwt-courts-response-to-covid-19> [perma.cc/N8DM-QVS3]
18. Territorial Court of Yukon, “Announcement” (17 March 2020), online (pdf ): Yukon Courts
<yukoncourts.ca/sites/default/fles/2020-06/covid_19_tc_announcement_mar_17_2020.
pdf> [perma.cc/2W9D-HP5P].
19. Territorial Court of Yukon, “Notice to the Profession and the Public” (19 June 2020), online
(pdf ): Yukon Courts <yukoncourts.ca/sites/default/fles/2020-06/covid_19_tc_notice_
june_19_2020_0.pdf> [perma.cc/AAE5-GF5W].
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Court of Justice suspended regular operations on March 16, later extending the
closure until July 3.20
Te Ontario Court of Justice adjourned all criminal court appearances
involving out-of-custody accused from March 16 to July 3, and it subsequently
extended the adjournment of criminal case management appearances until July
31.21 Te Cour du Québec suspended regular operations on March 13, with a
gradual reopening beginning June 1.22 Te Chief Justice of the Superior Court
of Québec, which likewise suspended operations, estimated that, in mid-May,
his court “was losing 1,000 judge days per month (i.e., the number of days that
judges are sitting on the bench).”23 When we consider all the court closures and
service reductions across Canada, only some of which are recounted here, the
total loss of court days is staggering.
When court closures went into efect, various criminal justice actors took
steps to move cases forward using virtual or telephone formats where possible,
albeit with varying levels of attention and alacrity. Yet, while these technologies
help to reduce trial delay, they cannot eliminate it. Virtual criminal trials and
preliminary hearings pose special challenges, given the accused’s statutory right
to be present in court for all indictable matters where evidence is being taken,24
and in light of the fact that our system privileges live witness testimony. Jury

20. Emma Tranter, “Nunavut court will face backlog when they reopen, says deputy minister,”
Nunatsiaq News (11 May 2020), online: <nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/90376> [perma.
cc/P84S-S6FH]; Nunavut Court of Justice, “Memo: Nunavut Court of Justice operations
update in response to Coronavirus (COVID-19): Resumption of limited In-Person Court
(IPC) criminal proceedings” (27 March 2020), online (pdf ): Nunavut Courts <www.
nunavutcourts.ca/images/phocadownload/Memo_to_Bar_Re_Resumption_of_In-person_
Court_in_Iqaluit_NCJ_May_27_2020_Pub.pdf> [perma.cc/6FRF-CXLZ].
21. Ontario Court of Justice, “COVID-19: Notice to Counsel and the Public re: Criminal
Matters in the Ontario Court of Justice” (2 July 2020), online: Ontario Courts <www.
ontariocourts.ca/ocj/covid-19/covid-19-criminal-matters> [perma.cc/8HZM-GXED].
22. Cour du Québec, “Gradual Resumption of Court of Québec Services Beginning June
1, 2020, in light of the COVID-19 Health Crisis,” online (pdf ): Te Courts of Québec
<www.tribunaux.qc.ca/c-quebec/codiv19/Covid19_Resumption_Province_en.pdf>
[perma.cc/C8E8-YPXR].
23. Elizabeth Raymer, “Quebec Superior Court chief justice highlights court administration
issues after COVID-19,” Canadian Lawyer (16 June 2020), online: <www.
canadianlawyermag.com/practice-areas/litigation/quebec-superior-court-chief-justicehighlights-court-administration-issues-after-covid-19/329888> [perma.cc/9YQJ-3TVK]
[Raymer, “Quebec”]
24. Criminal Code, supra note 7, s 650.
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trials, in particular, are uniquely challenging.25 Virtual proceedings of all kinds
also pose accessibility issues. Among other things, not all participants can access
the computer technology and high-speed internet necessary to engage in remote
proceedings.26 Accessibility is a particularly acute problem for accused persons
held on remand, who may have no computer access.27 Tere are also accessibility
concerns for persons with disabilities, who may encounter barriers if technologies
are not designed and utilized with due attention to inclusivity.28 With these
important caveats in mind, virtual criminal trials can work in appropriate
circumstances.29 But, again, they can only do so much to reduce delay.
Even the reopening of criminal courts has had a limited efect on trial delay.
Courts cannot return to full capacity during the pandemic. As of this writing,
staggered reopenings are being enabled by physical and procedural changes
to promote health and safety, such as the erection of plexiglass barriers in
courthouses.30 Tese changes take time to implement, and some existing spaces
may be too small to allow for physical distancing. Reopenings have therefore
been partial. For example, the Provincial Court of British Columbia announced
it was reopening a total of forty in-person trial courtrooms in June.31 In Ontario,
when trial courts reopened on July 6, 147 courtrooms were operational across

25. For an analysis of the challenges and possibilities associated with virtual jury trials, see Ken
Broda-Bahm, “Online Trials: Expect Both Challenges and Opportunities” (29 June 2020),
online: Lexology <www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=359fbe3e-6e15-4100-88e9d38bb913484c> [perma.cc/LC9S-MGJX].
26. See Te Agenda with Steve Paikin, “Removing Barriers to Justice in Ontario” (26 May 2020),
online (video): TVO <www.tvo.org/video/removing-barriers-to-justice-in-ontario> [perma.
cc/DM7F-HAYZ]. Criminal defence attorney Annamaria Enenajor has observed that virtual
court proceedings are “very dependent on privileged access to technology” and are therefore
less accessible to people who are economically disadvantaged, a disproportionate percentage
of whom are racialized (ibid).
27. See e.g. R v Vickerson, 2020 ONCA 434.
28. See e.g. Alaina Leary, “How to Make Your Virtual Meetings and Events Accessible to the
Disabled Community” (12 April 2020), online (blog): Rooted in Rights <rootedinrights.org/
how-to-make-your-virtual-meetings-and-events-accessible-to-the-disability-community>
[perma.cc/2TE9-4NCY].
29. See e.g. In Re: Court File No. 19/578, 2020 ONSC 3870.
30. Te Canadian Press, “Ontario courts to resume some in person proceedings today,” Law
Times (6 July 2020), online: <www.lawtimesnews.com/business-news/ontario-courts-toresume-some-in-person-proceedings-today/331202> [perma.cc/DZ5T-2974] [“Ontario
courts to resume”].
31. “Message from the Chief Judge: How the BC Provincial Court has met the challenges
of COVID-19” (12 June 2020), online: Provincial Court of British Columbia <www.
provincialcourt.bc.ca/enews/enews-12-06-2020> [perma.cc/BUM7-MTY4].
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forty-four locations (which was two short of the planned 149 courtrooms), and
the stated goal was to have all Ontario courtrooms operational by November 1.32
Even if a case is now set to go forward in a reconfgured courtroom, there
are new barriers. Some participants may not be able to travel for hearings due to
the pandemic. Others may be unable to enter courthouses if they fail required
COVID-19 screenings,33 whether because they are genuinely experiencing
symptoms, or because they are purporting to be symptomatic in a bid to avoid
participating. Te result is that some trials may need to be rescheduled if one or
more participants is unable to attend. When section 11(b) claims arise in the
context of such cases, courts will have to decide how to characterize that delay.
In sum, the implications of COVID-19 for section 11(b) rights across the
country are as obvious as they are concerning. What is less obvious is how to
respond. Te starting point, of course, is the Jordan framework that governs
section 11(b). I turn to that framework now.

II. THE CHALLENGE OF ASSESSING COVID DELAY UNDER
THE JORDAN FRAMEWORK
A. THE JORDAN FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING TRIAL DELAY

Section 11(b) of the Charter guarantees that, once a person has been charged
with a crime, the state will act reasonably to ensure that person will not be made
to endure an unreasonably long wait before the charge is resolved. Tis right to
reasonable state action in avoiding excessive trial delay is understood to implicate
the accused’s liberty interests, since trial delay prolongs the period during which
the accused is held in pre-trial custody or under release conditions; their security
of the person, because trial delay exacerbates the stigma and anxiety associated
with unresolved criminal charges; and their fair trial interests, since delay can
make it harder to mount an efective defence as evidence deteriorates or is lost.34
Te Jordan majority made clear that unreasonable trial delay is irrebuttably
prejudicial to accused persons. When it occurs, the remedy that issues through
section 24(1) of the Charter is a stay of proceedings.35
Section 11(b) claims are now adjudicated using the framework set out in
Jordan. First, the total period of delay is calculated. Tat period begins when
the accused is charged, and it runs until the actual or projected end of trial,
32.
33.
34.
35.

Ibid. See also “Ontario courts to resume,” supra note 30.
See e.g. “Ontario courts to resume,” supra note 30.
Jordan, supra note 2 at para 20.
R v Rahey, [1987] 1 SCR 588 [Rahey]. See also Jordan, supra note 2 at para 35.
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defned as the end of evidence and argument.36 Te total period excludes any
delay that is unequivocally waived by the defence or caused solely by defence
actions not “legitimately taken to respond to the charges.”37 Trial delay is
presumptively unreasonable if it surpasses eighteen months for cases tried before
the provincial court, or thirty months for cases tried in superior court or in
provincial court following a preliminary inquiry. Te Jordan majority explained
that, while prejudice to the accused is no longer expressly assessed under the
section 11(b) framework as it was in the pre-Jordan era, “it informs the setting of
the presumptive ceiling. Once the ceiling is breached, we presume that accused
persons will have sufered prejudice to their Charter-protected liberty, security of
the person, and fair trial interests.”38
If the ceiling is breached, the Crown must rebut the presumption of
unreasonableness by showing that the delay would have been below-ceiling but
for “exceptional circumstances”: circumstances that “lie outside the Crown’s control
in the sense that (1) they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable,
and (2) Crown counsel cannot reasonably remedy the delays emanating from
those circumstances once they arise.”39 Tese two defning features operate as two
prongs of the inquiry.40 First, the Crown must demonstrate that the precipitating
event was reasonably unforeseen or unavoidable; then, it must show that it “took
reasonable steps in an attempt to avoid the delay.”41 Applying the second prong
of the test in R v KJM, the Court frst considered whether the Crown could
have taken reasonable steps, then went on to consider whether “the justice system”
could have done so.42 Tus, when assessing whether presumptively unreasonable
delay is justifed by an exceptional circumstance, we should consider whether
that delay could have been mitigated by reasonable steps available to the Crown
or the criminal justice system; in other words, the state agents who administer the
prosecution of ofences. Tese agents are not held to a “standard of perfection,”
nor must the Crown show “that the steps it took were ultimately successful.”43
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

R v KGK, 2020 SCC 7 [R v KGK].
Jordan, supra note 2 at para 65.
Ibid at para 54.
Ibid at para 69 [emphasis in original].
R v Cody, 2017 SCC 31 at paras 58-59.
Jordan, supra note 2 at para 70.
R v KJM, 2019 SCC 55 at paras 101-102 [emphasis in original] [R v KJM]. Te dissenting
justices endorsed this aspect of the analysis and would have applied it even more stringently
by concluding, contra the majority, that some of the complained-of delay in that case was
attributable to errors by criminal justice ofcials other than the Crown and should therefore
have been included in the calculus of net delay.
43. Jordan, supra note 2 at paras 90, 70.
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Exceptional circumstances generally take one of two forms. Te frst is
“discrete events” such as medical emergencies. Delay attributable to discrete
events is subtracted from the total period, which is then reassessed against the
ceiling. Te second form is particularly complex cases, i.e., cases that properly
require an inordinate amount of time to prepare and/or try, given the nature of
the evidence or the issues. If a case is particularly complex, then the judge may
fnd the total period of delay is reasonable on a qualitative standard, even if it is
above the ceiling.
If the ceiling is not breached, then the delay is presumptively reasonable,
and the onus falls on the defence to show otherwise. To do so, the defence must
establish, frst, that it “took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained efort
to expedite the proceedings”; and second, that “the case took markedly longer
than it reasonably should have” in light of such factors as the case’s complexity,
local considerations, and the Crown’s eforts to expedite the proceedings.44
Finally, when it introduced this framework, the Jordan majority established
standards for cases already in the system. It instructed courts to take a fair
approach to assessing below-ceiling delay accrued in the pre-Jordan era, bearing in
mind that the previous section 11(b) jurisprudence did not expressly require the
defence to “demonstrate a sustained efort to expedite.” For above-ceiling cases, “a
transitional exceptional circumstance” could apply if the delay was justifed based
on the parties’ reasonable reliance on pre-Jordan standards, or if it was attributable
to institutional delay problems that would take time to remedy post-Jordan. Te
majority made it extremely clear, however, that it expected all stakeholders to take
meaningful steps to reduce trial delay: Signifcant institutional delay problems
could potentially justify lengthy delay for cases already in the system when Jordan
was issued, but they could not go unaddressed for long.
Te judgment stressed that chronic institutional delay is unacceptable, and
that all criminal justice system participants must engage in sustained, cooperative
eforts to promote timely trials.45 Tis message continues to resonate in the
post-Jordan era.46

44. Ibid at para 82.
45. Ibid at paras 5, 81, 112-17.
46. See R v Tanabalasingham, 2020 SCC 18 at para 9 [Tanabalasingham].
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B. APPLYING THE TWO-PRONG EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
ANALYSIS TO COVID DELAY

How does COVID delay ft into the Jordan framework, if at all? Te most obvious
answer is that COVID-19 is an exceptional circumstance. Yet, while this answer
may be obvious, it is not unproblematic. Te problem becomes apparent when
we consider how the two-prong exceptional circumstances analysis would apply
to COVID delay. Once again, the frst prong addresses whether the circumstance
giving rise to the delay was reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and
the second prong asks whether the Crown and the criminal justice system took
reasonable steps to avoid the delay.
1.

THE FIRST PRONG: THE DELAY IS REASONABLY UNFORESEEN OR
REASONABLY UNAVOIDABLE

Te frst prong of the analysis is relatively straightforward. COVID-19-related
court closures were “reasonably unforeseen,” at least at the outset. At a certain
point, of course, they were planned and publicized, and hence not unforeseen;
but even then, they remained “reasonably unavoidable.” Tat having been
said, COVID-19 difers from other circumstances that have been recognized
as “reasonably unforeseen” or “reasonably unavoidable” to date, inasmuch as
it is a systemwide occurrence. While this diference is not per se problematic
for purposes of the frst prong of the analysis, it is worth unpacking, since it
enhances the conceptual clarity of the argument that follows with respect to
the second prong.
As we have seen, exceptional circumstances generally fall under one of two
categories—discrete events, and particularly complex cases—although the Jordan
majority afrmed that “[t]he list is not closed.”47 Te “particularly complex cases”
category is of minimal relevance here. It applies to cases that take an unusually
long time to try due to the complexity of the evidence or the issues before the
court. Tese are the cases that would surpass the presumptive ceilings, even
if the parties were to act with reasonable alacrity and the system were to run
reasonably smoothly. In other words, these are the cases that should take longer.
For particularly complex cases, the circumstance resulting in the delay is not
unforeseen, but it is unavoidable since it is intrinsic to the case. Tere will,
of course, be particularly complex cases that are impacted by COVID-19, but
the category itself is not applicable to COVID delay: COVID-19 does not render
cases more complex in substantive or evidentiary terms.
47. Jordan, supra note 2 at para 71.
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Te “discrete events” category is more germane; but ultimately, it too is not
readily applicable to COVID delay. Discrete events that have been recognized to
date are one-of occurrences that stymy the progress of a specifc case, and which
are unforeseen and/or unavoidable. Examples include: late-breaking disclosure; 48
an unavoidable change of defence counsel; 49 a mistrial resulting from the elevation
of the trial judge to a higher court; 50 a medical issue necessitating rescheduling;51
an administrative error to do with a transcript request unrelated to the Crown;
52
a complainant’s failure to appear; 53 and an unplanned power outage.54 In each
of these scenarios, the delay resulted from an isolated event, not a systemic
one.55 Indeed, these “discrete events” can be referred to with greater precision as
“discrete case-specifc events”; i.e., discrete events that occurred in the context of
a particular case (or perhaps a very small subset of cases—picture, for example,
a blackout that delays a number of cases in a single courthouse on a given day).
Tey can be contrasted with “discrete systemwide events”; i.e., extrinsic events
that are systemwide in their scope and impact, such as COVID-19. Discrete
systemwide events have not been taken up by the section 11(b) jurisprudence
to date, and they present a special challenge. Tis is so because, while discrete
systemwide events satisfy the frst prong of the exceptional circumstances analysis,
they pose a unique problem when it comes to applying the second prong.
48. R v Live Nation Canada Inc, 2017 ONCJ 590 [Live Nation].
49. R v Jackson, 2017 ONSC 5925 [Jackson]. In some situations, delay arising out of a change of
counsel may be deducted as “defence delay.” See Jordan, supra note 2 at para 193.
50. Live Nation, supra note 48.
51. R v Côté, 2019 ONCJ 87; Jackson, supra note 49.
52. R v KJM, supra note 42.
53. R v Francis, 2019 ONCJ 173.
54. R v Herman, 2019 SKPC 31.
55. Te category has also been applied to a delay caused by the accused’s extradition to Canada.
See Jordan, supra note 2 at paras 72, 81. Here, courts distinguish delay resulting from the
Crown’s failure to act expeditiously (which is not justifed); delay resulting from the accused’s
attempts to avoid extradition (which constitutes defence delay); and delay genuinely
required to achieve extradition (which is the only type counted as a discrete event). See
R v Prince, 2018 ONSC 3033 at para 34. Inasmuch as delay associated with extradition
proceedings fows directly from the nature of those proceedings, it is arguably more akin
to “particularly complex cases” than to “discrete events” (ibid at para 15, citing R v Coulter,
2016 ONCA 704). It is nevertheless treated as a discrete event, presumably because it is
plainly time-limited and easily measured, which means it is best accounted for through the
quantitative analysis associated with the discrete events category, as opposed to the qualitative
analysis used for particularly complex cases. Delay resulting from COVID-19 may likewise
be quantifable and time-limited. But, unlike delay associated with extradition, it does not
fow directly and inevitably from the nature of the proceedings themselves; it is an extrinsic
problem, to be reasonably managed.

850

(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

2.

THE SECOND PRONG: REASONABLE STEPS TAKEN TO AVOID
THE DELAY

To make the point concrete, consider the kinds of responses various criminal
justice actors are taking, or could be taking, to reduce COVID delay. Te
most important strategy available to Crowns is robust charge screening. Te
conscientious, coordinated use of prosecutorial discretion to dispense with
low-priority cases is a key strategy for reducing wait times: By vigorously
screening cases and dismissing minor and/or dubious charges outright, Crown
attorneys can conserve limited time and resources for higher-priority cases.56 For
the balance of cases, Crowns can prefer diversion whenever possible; and they can
encourage swift resolution where appropriate by staking out fair and transparent
settlement positions, and by accepting defence-favourable positions whenever it
is reasonable for them to do so.57 Collaborative resolution discussions undertaken
in a spirit of fairness, together with careful charge-screening, can do much to
reduce delay. Tis is true in general, but it is particularly salient in the current
context, when trial delay is an especially grave concern.
Turning to the justice system more broadly, delay can be reduced by
creative, proactive investment in new technologies and procedures designed to
enable remote case management, disclosure, and appearances. In a recent series
of interviews, Canadian Lawyer magazine canvassed the chief justices of several
trial courts to learn about local responses to COVID-19. Teir comments are
illustrative. Chief Judge Melissa Gillespie of the Provincial Court of British
Columbia reported that her court used virtual conferencing technology to
conduct pre-trial conferences for all matters that were set for trial in March to
June 2020. She identifed further initiatives that would be helpful if implemented,
including e-fling, systems to facilitate the fling of exhibits and other documents

56. See e.g. Olivia Stefanovich, “Chief Justice Wagner denies crossing a line by suggesting
Criminal Code changes,” CBC News (18 June 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
stefanovich-criminal-defence-lawyers-concerns-post-pandemic-1.5615924> [perma.cc/
JLU4-7PXX]. Stefanovich quotes Toronto-based criminal defence lawyer Adam Boni,
stating: “Te Crown attorney has tremendous power to relieve backlogs through judicious,
reasonable, vigorous use of discretion” (ibid).
57. It is essential that Crown attorneys engaged in settlement negotiations prioritize fairness over
efciency. Tey must be alive to the risk of coerced guilty pleas, particularly given that some
accused may be tempted to plead guilty to avoid ongoing trial delay. See R v Myers, 2019
SCC 18 at para 22.
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during virtual hearings, greater access to technology for members of the public,
and legislative revisions to reduce in-person requirements.58
Chief Judge Terrence Matchett of the Provincial Court of Alberta described a
pilot project whereby various types of court appearances are conducted remotely
through videoconferencing. He reported that his court had held a few criminal
trials in this manner, and that it was moving towards hearing out-of-custody
guilty pleas by videoconference or telephone. He identifed the need for greater
investment in technology as the court’s biggest challenge, citing a need for more
hardware, IT support, and Wi-Fi access.59 Similarly, Chief Justice Jacques Fournier
of the Superior Court of Québec described a rollout of virtual courtrooms in
that province. He observed that the expansion of videoconferencing has taken
time, and that the expanded use of efciency-promoting technologies “should
have been done before” the pandemic. He commented, further, on the need for
lawyers to work together to resolve as many cases as possible.60
In June 2020, the Chief Justice of Canada (acting in his capacity as co-chair
of the Action Committee on Court Operations in Response to COVID-19
alongside Justice Minister David Lametti) reported that that committee was
considering various strategies in the course of developing national guidelines
to promote safety and efciency as courts reopen. Strategies reportedly under
consideration included Criminal Code amendments to facilitate the adducing
of evidence through video conferencing, and to allow judges to hear cases in
diferent regional jurisdictions, among others.61
58. Elizabeth Raymer, “B.C. Provincial Court’s pre-trial conferences have resolved multiple
matters before trial,” Canadian Lawyer (16 June 2020), online: <www.canadianlawyermag.
com/news/general/b.c.-provincial-courts-pre-trial-conferences-have-resolved-multiplematters-before-trial/330581> [perma.cc/XVF6-PX53].
59. Elizabeth Raymer, “Alberta’s provincial court is planning expanded WebEx remote capability
in most locations,” Canadian Lawyer (5 June 2020), online: <www.canadianlawyermag.
com/practice-areas/litigation/albertas-provincial-court-is-planning-expanded-webex-remotecapability-in-most-locations/330299> [perma.cc/TL8F-YRBQ].
60. Raymer, “Quebec” supra note 23.
61. Olivia Stefanovich, “Supreme Court chief justice suggests Criminal Code changes to cut
into court backlogs,” CBC News (13 June 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
stefanovich-chief-justice-reopening-proposals-1.5604773> [perma.cc/ST9A-MLXC].
See also “Terms of Reference, Action Committee on Court Operations in Response to
COVID-19” (22 May 2020), online: Department of Justice Canada <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/
csj-sjc/ccs-ajc/ac-ca/term.html> [perma.cc/4XT3-BF5U]; Department of Justice Canada,
News Release, “Chief Justice of Canada and Minister of Justice Launch Action Committee
on Court Operations in Response to COVID-19” (8 May 2020), online: Government of
Canada <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2020/05/chief-justice-of-canada-andminister-of-justice-launch-action-committee-on-court-operations-in-response-to-covid-19.
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We can imagine other potential responses. It is foreseeable that some trials
will be delayed when participants fail COVID-19 screenings and cannot enter
courtrooms.62 Under normal circumstances, a participant’s illness is treated as
a discrete event; but there is a marked diference between delay in a given case
caused by an ordinary but unanticipated illness, and delay caused by a screening
procedure that is adopted by the court and will foreseeably lead, on a regular
basis, to some participants being denied entry to the courthouse—albeit for
compelling public health reasons. It is likewise foreseeable that some trials may be
delayed due to participants’ pressing caregiving responsibilities. In both instances,
justice system actors should be expected to foresee these delays and proactively
address them. One approach may be for courts to facilitate last-minute virtual
appearances when individuals are well enough to participate but cannot attend
in-person. Tis method could be utilized on a consent basis, to account for the fact
that some parties may reasonably prefer to accept delay rather than proceeding
remotely. In addition to enabling participation from people who fail COVID-19
screenings, virtual hearings might be more manageable for some participants
who are balancing caregiving responsibilities, particularly if those hearings are
conducted with due fexibility and understanding—though for many, of course,
more meaningful caregiving support is desperately needed.63 Te bottom-line is
that a lot of the delay associated with COVID-19 is systemic in nature, even if
it resembles case-specifc delay: it is foreseeable on a general level, and it can be
reduced in the aggregate through reasonable, proactive institutional responses.
At the same time, some of the types of COVID delay canvassed in Part
I, above, could also be addressed by case-specifc Crown responses, in addition
to institutional responses. Tus, for example, where a trial date needs to be
rescheduled because a participant fails a COVID-19 screening, the Crown can
seek the earliest possible date. Te Crown’s ofce can likewise take steps to ensure
that, if an individual Crown attorney anticipates being unable to attend court
regularly due to extraordinary caregiving responsibilities, other colleagues take
html> [perma.cc/CVZ5-4VJX]. As of this writing, the recommendations have not
been made public.
62. See supra note 33.
63. Welcoming participants to the frst virtual Supreme Court of Canada hearing, Chief
Justice Wagner said, in part: “Tere will be hiccups and maybe even unexpected visits by
children and pets. Tis is OK. Tere are things that are beyond our control.” See Adrian
Humphreys, “‘Nothing is perfect the frst time’: Supreme Court’s frst hearing on Zoom
a success despite glitches,” National Post (9 June 2020), online: <nationalpost.com/news/
supreme-courts-frst-hearing-by-zoom-video-hits-early-glitch-after-deeply-human-openingaddress-by-chief-justice> [perma.cc/RFD7-DC2U].
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carriage of that Crown’s fles. Other case-specifc steps available to Crowns that
could reduce COVID delay include consenting if the accused seeks to re-elect
trial by judge alone, per section 472(1) of the Criminal Code,64 so as to avoid the
additional delay associated with jury trials in the COVID context; developing
and following concrete plans to minimize delay in cases impacted by COVID;
and taking a proactive, collaborative approach at pretrial conferences.
With the foregoing in mind, let us return to the second prong of the
exceptional circumstances inquiry, which queries whether the Crown and the
criminal justice system took reasonable steps to avoid the complained-of delay.
As we have just seen, some of the steps that may be helpful are case-specifc
and can therefore be assessed through the usual Jordan analysis. But, many of
the steps available to Crowns and to other criminal justice system actors to
reduce COVID delay are systemic in nature. Some of these are more ambitious,
such as Criminal Code amendments. Others are more immediately attainable,
like the implementation of more selective charge screening criteria. Some steps
have already been taken, but with room for expansion. Many were urged years
ago, including by the Jordan Court itself. Indeed, a Senate Committee Report
published in 2017, which has been cited by the Supreme Court of Canada’s
section 11(b) jurisprudence, ventured multiple suggestions, many of which are
now being repeated in the COVID context.65 Among them: comprehensive
Criminal Code review; improving case management; facilitating guilty pleas
through fair practices, including the provision of transparent information about
the Crown’s sentencing position; standardizing e-disclosure; and expanding the
use of technology.
In light of the foregoing, it would not be plausible for a Crown to assert, in any
individual case, that COVID delay could not have been mitigated by reasonable
steps. Put somewhat diferently, it is far from self-evident that the second prong
of the exceptional circumstances analysis will be satisfed in any given case, and
hence it requires a focused assessment. Te trouble is that the systemic steps
that could reasonably limit COVID delay would be difcult, if not impossible,
for trial judges to critically assess. Tis is so for myriad reasons, including the
unavailability of data; the elusiveness of workable standards against which to
64. Criminal Code, supra note 7.
65. Canada, Delaying Justice is Denying Justice: An Urgent Need to Address Lengthy Court Delays in
Canada (Ottawa: Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Afairs, 2017),
online (pdf ): <sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/LCJC/reports/Court_Delays_
Final_Report_e.pdf> [perma.cc/YC2N-N9US] [Canada, Delaying Justice is Denying Justice].
Te report was cited in R v KGK, supra note 36; R v KJM, supra note 42.
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measure institutional responses; the need to keep section 11(b) procedures
relatively streamlined; and the separation of powers, which imposes limitations
on the judicial scrutiny of legislative and executive decision making. It is one
thing, for example, to assess “whether the Crown, having initiated what could
reasonably be expected to be a complex prosecution, developed and followed a
concrete plan to minimize the delay occasioned by such complexity” as mandated
by Jordan; 66 but it is quite another to evaluate whether the Crown was guided
by an appropriate charge-screening policy. Even if Crowns were willing and able
to put ofcewide policies on the record—which is by no means a given—courts
would not be able to evaluate their sufciency without identifying appropriate
standards and comparators, and without trenching on prosecutorial discretion.67
Further, any attempt to engage in this sort of analysis would complicate and
extend section 11(b) proceedings at a time when it is particularly vital that those
proceedings be conducted efciently. In mid-August, the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice amended its Provincial Practice Direction to, among other
things, streamline section 11(b) applications, including by putting presumptive
caps on the court time that can be dedicated to them.68 In this practice context,
any variations to the section 11(b) standard that would signifcantly increase its
complexity are untenable.
C. CONTRASTING THE TRANSITIONAL EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE
WITH THE COVID CONTEXT

To be sure, generalized policies and practices impact the timelines of all criminal
trials, not just those afected by COVID-19. Yet, when applying the Jordan
framework in the ordinary course, judges need not consider general policies.
Te analysis works, not because the framework disregards systemic conduct, but
because it assesses that conduct indirectly, through the presumptive ceilings. Te
Jordan majority expressly intended the ceilings to motivate institutional reform:
66. Jordan, supra note 2 at para 79.
67. Te Court has made clear that trial judges should not interpolate themselves in exercises
of prosecutorial discretion when applying section 11(b); but, “[w]hile the court plays no
supervisory role for such decisions, Crown counsel must be alive to the fact that any delay
resulting from their prosecutorial discretion must conform to the accused’s s. 11(b) right”
(Jordan, supra note 2 at para 79). See also Tanabalasingham, supra note 46 at para 5.
Exercises of prosecutorial discretion are subject to very minimal judicial scrutiny, in light of
concerns about the separation of powers. See e.g. R v Anderson, 2014 SCC 41.
68. Ontario Superior Court of Justice, “Provincial Practice Direction/Amendment to the
Criminal Proceedings Rules Regarding Criminal Proceedings” (12 August 2020), online:
Ontario Courts <www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/practice/practice-directions/criminal#Part_
II_s_11b_8211_Appearances_on_Indictments> [perma.cc/HB2H-WAXX].
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“A presumptive ceiling is required in order to give meaningful direction to the
state on its constitutional obligations and to those who play an important role
in ensuring that the trial concludes within a reasonable time … .”69 Te ceiling
both spurs and guides criminal justice actors, serving as a metric by which their
eforts can be evaluated. If a trial takes longer than eighteen or thirty months,
as the case may be, and if the above-ceiling delay is not attributed to the defence
and/or exceptional circumstances, then by process of elimination, it must be
due to unreasonable Crown conduct, systemic delay, or both. As such, it cannot
be justifed. Tus, the Jordan framework does account for systemic eforts to
promote trial efciency, but it does not require judges to evaluate institutional
policies and practices.
In the COVID context, the ceilings cannot serve as an indirect means of
assessing systemic eforts to manage trial delay. Tis is so because, by their very
nature, discrete systemwide events like COVID-19 upend the system, such that
whatever policies and practices were in place to manage systemic delay prior to
the discrete systemwide event are rendered inadequate or inapposite. Discrete
systemwide events necessitate new, diferent approaches to managing systemic
delay, which take time to implement.
When the Jordan majority established the ceilings, it did not expect
criminal justice actors to get systemic delay in check instantly. It established the
“transitional exceptional circumstance” so that cases already in the system when
Jordan was decided would be assessed “contextually” in light of the pre-Jordan case
law that guided the parties at the operative time, and with some forbearance for
the systemic delay issues that characterized the pre-Jordan era. In efect, criminal
justice actors were granted a time-limited period to improve institutional delay.
Following the logic of the transitional exception, one could suggest that
courts should recognize a new, higher ceiling to account for COVID delay that
would apply temporarily and would account for the time required to implement
institutional responses to COVID-19. Tere are, however, at least three problems
with this suggestion. First, the Court has indicated a reticence to complicate
the Jordan framework by introducing multiple ceilings.70 Second, whereas the
transitional exceptional circumstance was confned to a limited time period
that was both unambiguous and non-arbitrary, it is not obvious how we could
sensibly delineate a temporary exception for COVID-19: At what point do we
expect institutional actors to have re-established equilibrium, particularly since
the pandemic may ebb and fow in the foreseeable future? Tird, the parties’
69. Jordan, supra note 2 at para 50.
70. R v KJM, supra note 42.
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conduct between the time when COVID delay became an issue, and the time
the new ceiling would be announced, would have to be evaluated with reference
to a retroactive standard. Te transitional exception worked because the parties’
conduct during the period to which it applied could be evaluated according to
the standards that governed at that time. Tere is no analogous set of shared
expectations that has been guiding criminal justice actors in the frst months of
the pandemic. Te transitional exception is of modest assistance, since it provides
some authority for the proposition that as time passes, we can expect more efective
institutional responses. Beyond that, it is of little help for present purposes.
At the end of the day, the Jordan framework assumes systemic eforts to
reduce delay will be accounted for by the section 11(b) analysis, but it does not
make space for such an assessment in the context of a discrete systemwide event
like COVID-19. As a result, we are caught between two untenable positions:
require Crowns to fully satisfy both prongs of the exceptional circumstances
analysis, including by showing that reasonable eforts were made on a systemic
level to reduce COVID delay, despite the fact that courts cannot realistically be
expected to adjudicate this issue; or, efectively declaw the second prong of the
analysis, even though doing so would informally relieve the Crown of much of
its burden while allowing some accused persons to sufer avoidable, unreasonably
protracted trial delay with no remedy. Neither position is acceptable. We need to
navigate between them by developing a novel approach.

III. RESPONDING TO COVID DELAY WITH SENTENCING
REDUCTIONS
Te frst step of developing a novel approach is identifying those cases to which
it would apply. In below-ceiling cases marked by COVID delay, the standards
are unchanged, since the exceptional circumstances analysis is not implicated.71
71. COVID delay could potentially inform the below-ceiling analysis, but its role in that analysis
is far less obvious than in the above-ceiling cases. Te assessment for below-ceiling delay
is somewhat more elastic and takes into account Crown conduct, among other factors,
to decide whether the case took “markedly longer than it reasonably should have” (Jordan,
supra note 2 at para 48). Te defence bears the onus, and it must also show that it took
“meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained efort to expedite the proceedings” (ibid).
In the COVID context, the defence could perhaps argue that the case took markedly longer
than it should have due to institutional and individual failures to respond to COVID delay,
but this argument would likely be a difcult one to mount, given the Court’s admonishment
that “stays beneath the ceiling [are expected] to be rare, and limited to clear cases” (ibid).
Te defence could also argue that the acute prejudice sufered by those jailed during the
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For above-ceiling cases, we should begin, as usual, by calculating the total period
of delay, excluding any defence delay. We should then subtract any delay that
is attributable to exceptional circumstances and is not COVID-19-related; any
COVID delay that occurred may or may not need to be specifcally addressed,
depending on how the rest of the analysis plays out, and so there is no need to
take it up just yet. If the remaining total period of delay is below the ceiling,
then the delay is presumptively reasonable, irrespective of how the COVID delay
is treated; hence, the standards for below-ceiling delay can apply as usual, and
there is no need to address whether the COVID delay ought to be deducted as
an exceptional circumstance. If the remaining total period of delay is above the
ceiling, then the next question is whether it would still be above the ceiling were
the COVID delay subtracted as an exceptional circumstance. If the answer is
yes, then once again, the COVID delay is not determinative: Te total period of
delay is presumptively unreasonable in any event, and since it cannot be justifed
using the exceptional circumstances analysis no matter how the COVID delay is
treated, a stay should follow. If the answer is no, then the COVID delay may be
determinative, and its status must be specifcally addressed.
In cases where the COVID delay is determinative, the defence should be
allowed to take the position that, even if the COVID delay were discounted
entirely, such that the total period of delay would fall below the ceiling, that delay
would still be unreasonable under the usual Jordan standard. If the defence can
demonstrate that a section 11(b) violation occurred, irrespective of the COVID
delay, then a stay is warranted. Where the defence does not take this position,
it will be necessary to confront the COVID delay directly. At this juncture,
it is appropriate to frst consider whether the Crown took, or ought to have
taken, reasonably available case-specifc steps to manage COVID delay, examples
of which were canvassed in Part II(B)(2), above. To the extent that the Crown
failed to take reasonably available case-specifc steps, the resultant delay cannot
satisfy the exceptional circumstances test, and so it should attract a stay. Tis
result follows from the standard Jordan framework and does not turn on how we
address the problem of accounting for systemwide responses to COVID delay.

pandemic should be expressly accounted for in the below-ceiling analysis. Tis argument
could be advanced on the basis of the Court’s holding in R v KJM that “[i]n youth cases, the
enhanced need for timeliness in youth matters should be included as another factor to be
considered in determining the reasonable time requirements of a particular case” (supra note
42 at para 71). Arguably, like youth, accused persons held on remand during the pandemic
are a readily identifed group for whom trial delay is (or should be) recognized as especially
prejudicial. See text accompanying notes 100-02.
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Once these analytic steps have been exhausted, we are left with those cases
in which the COVID delay is determinative and could not reasonably have been
avoided by case-specifc steps. For these residual cases, the problem of accounting
for systemwide responses to COVID delay cannot be avoided: Te section 11(b)
analysis should turn on the question of whether the delay would have breached
the ceiling had the Crown and the criminal justice system taken reasonably
available steps, on a systemwide level, to reduce trial delay. As we have seen,
however, that question is resistant to analysis under the Jordan framework.
One could take the position that, in these cases, the section 11(b) challenge
should succeed: Te Crown cannot discharge its burden, and so the presumption
of unreasonableness prevails. Te problem is that, if this position were adopted,
it could result in large numbers of charges being stayed because of the pandemic.
Te Jordan Court made it very clear that the system cannot countenance staying
massive numbers of cases because of delay, and that this result would damage the
repute of the administration of justice.72 Justice Minister Lametti announced that
Parliament would consider intervening to prevent it from occurring.73 As such,
an argument for staying cases whenever COVID delay is determinative departs
from some of the commitments that animate Jordan, and in any event, it would
almost certainly be rejected in practice. I have argued that the opposite extreme—
simply eschewing a meaningful assessment and thereby denying section 11(b)
claims when COVID delay is determinative—must likewise be rejected as both
unjust and inconsistent with Jordan. Tat approach makes the accused whose
Charter right is at issue bear the cost of the Charter framework’s defciency.
In sum, then, insisting on a stay where the Crown cannot practicably discharge
its burden is at best unrealistic, while denying a remedy when the Crown has not
actually discharged its burden is unjust. What, then, is the solution?
We can avoid the two extremes by granting an alternative remedy, namely a
sentencing reduction, in cases where COVID delay is determinative. Admittedly,
this solution is imperfect. A sentencing reduction does nothing for accused
persons who are acquitted after lengthy delays. It may be of limited value in
cases involving mandatory minimum sentences. It arguably reduces the value
of the accused’s section 11(b) right. Yet, it achieves a more nuanced result than
the alternatives, and it does so while remaining relatively straightforward to
apply—an important consideration, given the ambitions of the Jordan Court to
72. Jordan, supra note 2 at para 94.
73. Olivia Stefanovich, “Justice minister says he’s ready to legislate if pandemic delays lead
to charges being tossed,” CBC News (15 July 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
stefanovich-jordan-decision-covid19-cases-delay-1.5638893> [perma.cc/T3BL-H9NQ].
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streamline the section 11(b) standard, and the particular need to avoid lengthy
section 11(b) proceedings at a time when courts will predictably be overwhelmed.
Two doctrinal paths lead to this pragmatic solution. One cuts through the
section 11(b) jurisprudence to establish sentencing reductions as a remedy for
unreasonable trial delay authorized by section 24(1) of the Charter. Te other
takes a detour around the section 11(b) jurisprudence by making COVID delay a
mitigating factor under the sentencing analysis mandated by the Criminal Code.74
I will map both paths in turn.
A. SENTENCING REDUCTIONS UNDER THE CHARTER

Te governing section 11(b) case law identifes a stay of proceedings as the only
available remedy for unconstitutional trial delay. Tis is so despite the fexibility
suggested by section 24(1) of the Charter, which authorizes remedies for Charter
violations.75 Te holding that all section 11(b) violations automatically require
a stay of proceedings was arrived at in 1987 in R v Rahey,76 which reversed the
Court’s decision in R v Mills, issued the previous year.77 Rahey was decided by
a bench of eight justices, six of whom concurred that a stay is the only suitable
remedy because, in efect, once an accused has been subjected to unreasonable
trial delay, anything short of staying the proceedings will exacerbate the Charter
violation. Four of the justices also stated that a stay of proceedings must follow
because, when a section 11(b) breach occurs, the court loses its jurisdiction to
proceed78—though this analysis did not ultimately gain much traction.79

74. Criminal Code, supra note 7, ss 718-718.2.
75. See Charter, supra note 1, s 24(1). Section 24(1) states: “(1) Anyone whose rights or
freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court
of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just
in the circumstances” (ibid).
76. Rahey, supra note 35.
77. R v Mills, [1986] 1 SCR 863 at 965-66.
78. Ibid at 889, Dickson CJ, Lamer J (Justice Estey and Justice Wilson concurring on this point).
79. Christopher Sherrin, “Reconsidering the Charter Remedy for Unreasonable Delay in
Criminal Cases” (2016) 20 CCLR 263 at 271 (“Te claim did not truly amount to an
additional justifcation for the chosen remedy of a stay. It was really nothing more than
an assertion made in the course of articulating the argument [that a lesser remedy would
exacerbate the Charter breach]. Te claim also never attracted support from a majority
of the Court,” ibid, n 52) [Sherrin, “Unreasonable Delay”]. See also Andrew Pilla & Levi
Vandersteen, “Re-Charting the Remedial Course for Section 11(b) Violations Post-Jordan”
(2020) 56 Osgoode Hall LJ 436 at 450-51. But see R v Hartling, 2020 ONCA 243 at para
112 [Hartling].
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Te decision in Rahey to limit the section 11(b) remedy has long been
controversial,80 and the Court has signaled a willingness to reconsider it.81
Christopher Sherrin has persuasively argued that Rahey’s core rationale—that
continuing the trial will exacerbate the violation—has “superfcial appeal but
ultimately collapses on closer scrutiny. It incorrectly assumes that the problem
is delay in and of itself, when the problem is actually the efects of delay on
constitutionally protected interests.”82 Sherrin points out that if another remedy
were adequate to address the harms associated with trial delay—namely,
prejudice to liberty, security of the person, and/or trial fairness—then that other
remedy would sufce. Other scholars agree that Rahey should be overturned,
citing theoretical and pragmatic reasons, including a concern that the extreme
remedy makes courts less likely to fnd a violation.83 Te aforementioned
Senate Committee Report likewise recommended expanding the remedies for
unreasonable trial delay.84
Others have argued for the status quo.85 Te Criminal Lawyers’ Association
(CLA) recently defended Rahey in an intervenor brief before the Court.86 It made
three points of note. First, it argued that the threat of a stay motivates criminal
justice actors to promote trial efciency. Second, it urged that introducing
more remedies would “create precisely the litigation uncertainty that Jordan was
trying to eliminate” while reintroducing the focus on individual prejudice that
was disavowed in Jordan. Finally, it argued that the rest of the section 11(b)
80. Sherrin, “Unreasonable Delay,” supra note 79.
81. Jordan, supra note 2 (“We were not invited to revisit the question of remedy. Accordingly,
we refrain from doing so” at para 35, n 1).
82. Sherrin, “Unreasonable Delay,” supra note 79 at 264.
83. See Pilla & Vandersteen, supra note 79; Honourable Marc Rosenberg, “Twenty-Five Years
Later: Te Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the Criminal Law”
(2009) 45 SCLR (2d) 233; Colin Wood, “Te Infexible Stay of Proceedings: Alternative
Remedies for Charter for Section 11(b) Breaches” (2016) 2 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues
80; Daved Muttart, “Section 11(b): A Case of the Trees Blocking LaForest” (2017) 64 Crim
LQ 173; Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, 2nd ed (Tomsen Reuters, 2019)
at 9.1050-9.1170; Justice Chris de Sa, “Understanding R v Jordan: A New Era for Section
11(b)” (2018) 66 Crim LQ 93.
84. Canada, Delaying Justice Is Denying Justice, supra note 65 at 36-40.
85. See e.g. Keara Lundrigan, “R v Jordan: A Ticking Time Bomb” (2018) 41 Man LJ 113.
86. KGK v Her Majesty the Queen, 2020 SCC 7 (Factum of the Intervener,
Criminal Lawyers’ Association Ontario), online (pdf ): <www.scc-csc.ca/
WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/38532/FM060_Intervener_Criminal-Lawyers’Association-(Ontario).pdf> [perma.cc/DC69-996G] [CLA Factum] (Te section 11(b)
remedy was raised for the frst time by the respondent on fnal appeal and was not taken
up by the Court).
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caselaw—which is “parsimonious in defning the contours of what constitutes a
breach”—has been calibrated to the current remedy.87
For present purposes, I do not take a position on whether the section 11(b)
remedy should be revised in general; my concern is limited to whether and how
a lesser remedy could be applied in cases involving COVID delay. I agree with
Sherrin that it is not intrinsically unjust or illogical to grant a lesser remedy for
section 11(b), since the harm to be redressed is not the delay per se, but the
prejudice irrebuttably associated with that delay. I recognize, however, that one
could subscribe to this view while also accepting the CLA’s arguments for limiting
the section 11(b) remedy, at least so long as the Jordan framework governs. If one
accepts, as I do, that there is no intrinsic problem with establishing sentencing
reductions as a remedy for trial delay, then one could take the position that
sentencing reductions are an appropriate section 11(b) remedy for cases where
COVID delay is determinative.88 Tis position would not be incompatible with
the belief that, in all other cases where a more refned application of the Jordan
framework is possible, the only available remedy should be a stay. Ultimately, the
difculty with the argument is that, while it fnds some indirect support in recent
Court of Appeal for Ontario jurisprudence, it is hard to square with Rahey.
In R v Charley and R v Hartling, the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered
the appropriate remedy for unreasonable delay occurring at the sentencing
phase.89 Te court did not fnd itself to be bound by Rahey, since a conviction is
not tainted by a section 11(b) Charter breach occurring at the post-verdict stage,
and so it is not necessary to stay that conviction.90 In Charley, the court left the
matter of remedy unsettled, having found no section 11(b) violation. In Hartling,
it ultimately determined that staying a conviction because the sentencing process
took too long “would bring the administration of justice into disrepute,” yet a
remedy was warranted, since the delay prejudiced the accused and undermined
87. Ibid at paras 19-21. Te CLA also endorsed the rationale in Rahey. CLA Factum, supra
note 86 at para 19.
88. Tere is no reason in principle why, if a section 11(b) violation at the trial phase could be
remedied by a sentencing reduction, it could not also be remedied in other ways. Indeed,
Sherrin has proposed a variety of remedies tailored to the particular harms to be addressed.
Sherrin, “Unreasonable Delay,” supra note 79. Tis more nuanced approach is, of course,
more consistent with the critique of Rahey, which seeks to shift our focus on the discrete
harms associated with trial delay. For present purposes, I have nevertheless embraced a
blunter analysis, which is simpler to apply—an important consideration at a time when
courts will be especially inundated.
89. R v Charley, 2019 ONCA 726 [Charley]; Hartling, supra note 79.
90. Hartling, supra note 79 at para 113; Charley, supra note 89 at paras 107-09. Cf R v
Croteau, 2020 ONCJ 55.
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broader social interests. It concluded the delay should be addressed at sentencing
and “should result in enhanced mitigation.”91
Drawing on this analysis, one could argue that cases involving COVID delay
require a similar balancing: On the one hand, it would bring the administration
of justice into disrepute to stay those cases across the board, particularly if there
were no meaningful opportunity for the Crown to show that the delay was
justifed; but on the other hand, COVID delay causes real harm that warrants a
remedy. To be sure, the doctrinal analysis in Charley and Hartling does not apply
directly to current circumstances, since that analysis hinged on the distinction
between pre- and post-verdict delay, whereas the COVID delay cases will mostly
be cases involving pre-verdict trial delay. Te broader theme of Charley and
Hartling, however, is that a principled analysis is required in cases where issuing
a stay is untenable but declining to fnd a section 11(b) violation is unjust, and
that analysis can ultimately support an alternative section 11(b) Charter remedy.
Still, while this analysis is compelling on its own terms, as applied to the COVID
context, it whistles past Rahey. It is therefore unlikely to be accepted unless Rahey
is overturned or distinguished.
B. SENTENCING REDUCTIONS UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE

If sentencing reductions cannot be achieved through the Charter, they can
nevertheless be aforded through the usual sentencing process, per the Court’s
unanimous reasons in Nasogaluak.92 In that case, the Court recognized that
extended trial delay can justify a lower sentence, whether or not it rises to the
level of a Charter breach: 93
[T]he sentencing regime provides some scope for sentencing judges to consider
not only the actions of the ofender, but also those of state actors. Where the state
misconduct in question relates to the circumstances of the ofence or the ofender,
the sentencing judge may properly take the relevant facts into account in crafting a
ft sentence, without having to resort to s. 24(1) of the Charter.

More particularly, state misconduct can factor into sentencing via the
proportionality analysis mandated by section 718.1 of the Criminal Code.
A proportionate sentence “expresses, to some extent, society’s legitimate
shared values and concerns”—including the values enshrined in the Charter.94
If impugned state conduct relates to the ofender and to the circumstances of the
91.
92.
93.
94.

Hartling, supra note 79 at para 119.
Nasogaluak, supra note 7 at para 3.
Ibid at para 2.
Ibid at para 49.
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ofence, then accounting for it at sentencing gives expression to Charter values
and thereby advances the sentencing principle of proportionality.
Te Court afrmed that “a sentence can be reduced in light of state
misconduct even when the incidents complained of do not rise to the level of a
Charter breach,” and it cited several examples, including cases in which excessive
trial delay falling below the section 11(b) threshold was treated as a mitigating
factor.95 In one of those cases, R v Bosley, Justice Doherty observed that “excessive
delay which causes prolonged uncertainty for the appellant but does not reach
constitutional limits can be taken into consideration as a factor in mitigation of
sentence.”96 COVID delay will, in many cases, cause “prolonged uncertainty”
and other manifest harms to the accused. Indeed, where the total period of delay
surpasses the Jordan ceiling, harm can be presumed. Further, there is no issue as
to the nexus between any state misconduct giving rise to extended delay and the
circumstances of the ofender. Te less obvious point, for present purposes, is that
COVID delay can be attributed to “state misconduct.”
Te term “misconduct” can suggest abuse or impropriety by one or more
individual state actors, as was the case in Nasogaluak itself, where the accused was
injured by excessive police force and then left without medical treatment. It can
also apply to more impersonal, less dramatic encroachments on Charter-protected
interests, however. Te excessive delay cases cited by the Nasogaluak Court
prove the point. In Bosley, for example, the excessive delay at issue was mostly
characterized as “institutional delay” and mainly stemmed from the trial judge’s
inability to take sufcient time away from his other institutional duties to craft his
reasons.97 In another cited case, R v Leaver, the unacceptable delay was attributed
to “unsatisfactory” court scheduling practices.98 Tus, COVID delay could entitle
an accused to a sentencing remedy under Nasogaluak to the extent that it refects
systemic delay. COVID delay does indeed refect systemic delay. If nothing else,
many of the strategies that could have meaningfully reduced COVID delay from
the outset, such as greater technological investment, were touted long before
the pandemic. Tey were pushed by various stakeholders and commentators,
including the Senate Committee and the Jordan Court itself. In this light,
it is not a stretch to say that, even if the failure to implement those strategies is
95. Ibid at para 53, citing R v Bosley, [1992] 18 CR (4th) 347 (Ont CA) [Bosley], R v Leaver
(1996), 3 CR (5th) 138 (Ont CA) [Leaver], and R v Panousis, 2002 ABQB 1109 (reversed by
2004 ABCA 211).
96. Supra note 95.
97. Ibid.
98. Leaver, supra note 95 at para 2.

864

(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

not enough to ground a section 11(b) violation, it is sufcient to justify treating
COVID delay as a mitigating factor at sentencing under Nasogaluak.
Quite apart from the fact that COVID delay can plausibly be attributed
to “misconduct,” the broader principle expressed in Nasogaluak is instructive.
Nasogaluak recognizes that a proportionate sentence is one that balances and
expresses the diferent values that animate our criminal justice system, and which
relate to the experience of the individual ofender. When crafting a proportionate
sentence, judges are expected to account for the diferent ways in which the
criminal justice process has subjected the accused to harshness and deprivation,
in order to ensure that the sum total of the accused’s experience culminating
in the actual sentence will not be disproportionately harsh. Te sentencing
assessment therefore accounts for such things as the hardship of pretrial detention,
and the harms occasioned by collateral consequences arising out of the ofence
or the prosecution.99 Even if COVID delay is not attributed to misconduct,
it is nevertheless a hardship that relates directly to the ofender’s Charter-protected
rights. It should be considered as a mitigating factor at sentencing.
C. CALCULATING THE SENTENCING REDUCTION

If a sentencing reduction is to apply—either as a remedy for a section 11(b)
violation, or because COVID delay is a mitigating factor at sentencing—then
it will of course be necessary to calculate that reduction. It is not possible to
ofer a general formula: “As with mitigating circumstances generally, there can
be no automatic or formulaic calculation of the reduction in sentence. … Te
jurisprudence will—as always—develop with each case determined on its own
particular facts, considering the ofence, the ofender, the length of the delay, the
circumstances of the delay and any other relevant factors.”100 Tere are, however,
a few general considerations that may be of assistance, beyond the basic principle
that the specifc circumstances of the case must of course inform how COVID
delay should be weighted within the proportionality analysis.
First, as we have seen, the transitional exception suggests that, once the
criminal justice system is on notice that institutional responses to trial delay
are required, we can expect those responses to improve over time. By the same
token, as more time passes, inadequate systemic responses are more deserving of
censure. To the extent that the purpose of the sentencing reduction is to afrm
Charter values, it therefore makes sense to aford a more generous reduction the
99. R v Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2016 SCC 14 at para 8; R v Suter, 2018 SCC 34.
100. Hartling, supra note 79 at para 122.
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further we get from March 2020, when the criminal justice system became fully
aware of the need to manage COVID delay.
Second, since the sentencing reduction is meant to redress harms to the
accused, it should also be informed by a high-level assessment of the harms
that a particular accused experienced. Te heightened prejudice associated
with pretrial detention is especially relevant. It has long been understood that
pretrial detention is prejudicial, but this is especially so in the current context.
COVID-19 can spread rapidly in jails, where conditions make social distancing
and recommended hygiene practices virtually impossible to implement.101 Eforts
to prevent its spread have resulted in further restrictions on incarcerated persons,
who may be confned to their cells for longer stretches to limit exposure.102 Te
result is that jails are even harsher and more dangerous than usual. In suggesting
that harms occasioned by delay should be factored into the analysis—including,
but not limited to, the prejudice associated with pretrial detention—I am
mindful of the fact that the Jordan majority sought to streamline matters by
eliminating the assessment of individual prejudice. Jordan does not, however,
purport to apply to criminal sentencing. Tat said, the imperative of keeping
processes within a manageable scope operates in both contexts. Te best
approach, therefore, is likely one that accounts for prejudice in a pixilated fashion
by looking at general indicators like whether the accused was held in pretrial
detention during the pandemic. In addition, while evidence of specifc prejudice
may entitle the accused to a more signifcant sentencing reduction, it should
not be regarded as a precondition to one, since any protracted trial delay is
understood to be prejudicial.
Tird, COVID-19 can warrant sentencing reductions for reasons other
than trial delay. Accused persons may, for example, receive enhanced pretrial
credit given the particular harshness of pretrial detention during the pandemic.
Likewise, there is now some precedent for imposing quantitively lower criminal
sentences during the pandemic, since COVID-19 makes custodial sentences
qualitatively harsher.103 Because these various sentencing reductions address
diferent issues, they should be counted separately and cumulatively.
101. See e.g. Simon Lewsen, “Social Distancing Is Impossible in Prisons. Why Are Tey Still Full?”
Te Walrus (12 May 2020), online: <thewalrus.ca/social-distancing-is-impossible-in-prisonswhy-are-they-still-full> [perma.cc/D39Y-NWDK].
102. Valérie Ouellet & Joseph Loiero, “COVID-19 taking a toll in prisons, with high infection
rates, CBC News analysis shows,” CBC News (17 June 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/prisons-jails-inmates-covid-19-1.5652470> [perma.cc/AQ85-QJUJ].
103. See e.g. R v Stevens, 2020 BCPC 104; R v Studd, 2020 ONSC 2810; R v Hearns, 2020
ONSC 2365; cf R v Rich, [2020] NJ No 90 (Prov Ct).
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A fnal caveat. My argument for afording a lesser remedy for COVID delay
responds to the particularities of discrete systemwide events; it is not an argument
for reducing section 11(b) remedies across the board. In this connection,
it is important to underscore that discrete systemwide events are vanishingly rare.
We could perhaps imagine a scenario in which resources were diverted away from
the criminal justice system to respond to some exigency, but where the pressure
on the criminal justice system resulted solely from that budgetary decision.
In other words, we can imagine an emergency situation having an indirect efect
on trial delay. Tis scenario should not count as a discrete systemwide event.
Te core message of Jordan is that, if we are going to prosecute people, we must
invest enough to do so in a Charter-compliant fashion. Nothing in the present
analysis would support state ofcials diverting resources away from the criminal
justice system, even for a compelling reason, and then arguing that the resulting
trial delays should attract lesser remedies as a result of that choice to deprioritize
criminal court operations.
In short, adopting the proposed solution for addressing COVID delay
within the Jordan framework would not impact the majority of section 11(b)
cases. Tere is no logical or practical impediment to implementing it while
also maintaining that any case which is not impacted by a discrete systemwide
event—that is, the overwhelming majority of criminal cases—should be decided
under the received Jordan framework, and should only be remedied by a stay of
proceedings if a section 11(b) violation is established. Te notion that we should
adopt an alternative remedy for excessive trial delay may look like a signifcant
departure from our existing section 11(b) standards, but my suggestion is that
we apply that remedy surgically, in response to a problem that is both sui generis
and acute, and in a context wherein the only realistic alternative is to provide
no remedy at all. Once we accept that the Jordan framework cannot account
for delay caused by discrete systemwide events like COVID-19, we see that
varying the framework in these cases is hardly a radical step—or in any event,
it is a necessary one.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault considers various measures of state
control introduced in response to the plague in late seventeenth-century France.
He contrasts what he calls the “whole literary fction of the festival [that] grew
up around the plague: suspended laws, lifted prohibitions, the frenzy of passing
time, bodies mingling together without respect” with “a political dream of
the plague, which was exactly the reverse: not the collective festival, but strict
divisions; not laws transgressed, but the penetration of regulation.”104 Tus,
according to Foucault, a state of emergency caused by a deadly contagion was
met by two contrasting visions. Te frst was of chaos and lawlessness. In the
context of section 11(b), this vision is, in essence, the lurid image that invariably
informs popular discourse about criminal charges being stayed due to trial
delay: the image of criminals being set free in mockery of the law—as though to
vindicate an individual’s constitutional rights is not to enforce our most vital and
foundational law. Foucault’s second vision was of unyielding and proliferating
state control. It is even more nefarious. It is the fction that, by circumscribing
individual rights and expanding state power, we can attain normalcy during an
emergency. In the context of section 11(b), it tells us that, by the stroke of a
pen and the invocation of “exceptional circumstances,” courts can nullify the
acute sufering that COVID delay is inficting on accused persons, without
requiring Crown attorneys to discharge their burden of justifying presumptively
unreasonable delay. In truth, neither vision is accurate, and neither is desirable.
We cannot realistically expect courts to simply stay thousands of criminal charges
because of COVID-19; but neither should we accept that the harm caused to
accused persons by COVID delay does not merit a remedy. We must navigate
between these two extremes.
Tis article has proposed one possible route: Where COVID delay proves
to be decisive, the accused should be entitled to a sentencing reduction, either
as a Charter remedy or, more feasibly, through the statutory sentencing process.
Admittedly, resort to a lesser remedy in the face of pervasive uncertainty about
the merits and structure of a Charter claim is hardly ideal. But, when it comes
to generating workable, real-time responses to a global pandemic, very little is.

104. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: Te Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan
(Vintage Books, 1975) at 197-98.

